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INIGO BOCKEN
THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAYMAN
The Meaning of the Imitatio Christi for a Theory of Spirituality
1. THE DILEMMA OF THE LAYMAN IN MODERNITY AND THE TASK OF A THEORY
OF SPIRITUALITY
Without any doubt, the character of the ‘layman’ belongs to the most fundamen-
tal cultural paradigms which characterize modern society and its forms of think-
ing and experiencing. One of the most discussed examples of the role of this
paradigm today may be the principle of laicité, on which the French state and
society are built. This principle is generally understood as the legitimate
heritage of the Enlightenment and as such is the expression of the emancipation
of the individual and its capacity of autonomous thinking, its liberation from
the repression of hierarchically structured forms of power and communal life.
Another, though historically much later, example of the emancipation in the
sign of the layman, can be found in the Catholic Church. The movement which
– inspired by the Second Vatican Council – stressed the positive and decisive role
of laity in the church, is in many ways an expression of the same emancipatory
project which intended to liberate the individual from the enslavement to hierar-
chical structures, or, to use the words of Immanuel Kant, to liberate it from its
‘selbstverschuldete Unmundigkeit’. 
In modernity (from the 17th century onwards), the character of the layman
seems to function as a metaphor for the emancipation from repressing and
humiliating powers in history. It belongs to the myths which modernity told to
itself that it is precisely our enlightened new age which is able to set free all those
unused and suppressed possibilities of the human individual and to lead it to a
glorious flowering. This emancipation seemed to be boundless. The profusion
of possibilities which arose from this way of thinking endangered all concrete and
traditional forms of life and installed new, more hidden authoritarian power
claims, which again were formulated in terms of the ‘layman’. For, the concept
of the layman seems also to refer to a second, almost contradictory cultural devel-
opment. Other than in the emancipative meaning of the word, ‘laymen’ in mod-
ern terminology are those who are not specialists. In other words, the layman is
the one who lacks the necessary knowledge to fulfill particular tasks or to response
to particular questions. ‘Specialisation’, together with the emancipation of the
individual with its autonomous rationality, forms a second characteristic shift of
modern society. Both characteristics develop relatively independent from each other,
sometimes even seem to conflict with each other. The enlightened emancipation
threatened to turn into its opposite through new monopolies of knowledge,
which contained new power claims. 
‘Spirituality’ refers to a field in which – more than in other forms of human
experience and knowledge – this conflict finds its most explicit shape. On the
one hand, every claim to be a spiritual specialist seems to be in radical opposi-
tion to the value experiences of late modern society: in the name of tolerance it
is impossible to claim the monopoly of spiritual knowledge. Those who make
such a claim risk to be suspected of being either clerical fundamentalists or
omniscient gurus. At the other hand, knowledge and insight in our society can
only be mediated and developed by ‘specialists’. If such a specialised mediation is
impossible for spirituality – and this impossibility belongs to the cultural patterns
of expectation towards spiritual experience – it seems to be able to identify spir-
ituality with the aura of vague and confuse inner feelings. Public and general crite-
ria, articulated by ‘specialists’, clash with the very personal character of those inti-
mate experiences of the human soul. 
To escape from this dilemma is the task of every theory of spirituality in an
actual cultural constellation, at least if this theory of spirituality wants to be more
than just a history of spirituality. The reduction of a theory of spirituality to a his-
torical description would not only be a makeshift solution, also it would make it
impossible to articulate the criteria according to which it can be made clear which
phenomena or texts belong to history and which do not. To avoid this question
would mean that we do not take seriously the actual need for spirituality. Since
the theme has become again one of the central topics of political debates – there
seems to be a silent social consent that ‘religion’ in modern society will be shaped
by its spiritual dimensions, far more than by its institutional ones. We do not have
to decide whether this is true or not. More important is the question, which
Charles Taylor recently put on the agenda in his study on the variety of
contemporary religions, for a criterion with which spirituality can be discerned
from other ‘inner’ experiences.1 An exclusive internalisation of experience leads to
a contamination of concepts, with the consequence that everything – and there-
fore nothing – is spirituality. An exclusive externalisation at the other hand – a his-
torical perspective or a perspective of the religious sciences – is blind as to the
concrete personal and individual experience, which is typical for the spiritual life. 
The problem at stake is characteristic for the logic which determines late modern
society as such and is expressed in the ambiguity of the concept of the ‘layman’,
1 See Charles Taylor, Varieties of religions today: William James revisited, Cambridge (MA) 2003.
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as it appears for instance in the relation between patient and doctor, or between
client and therapist. ‘Spirituality’ however is that field in which this problem
gets its most radical shape because the determination of the field itself is discussed
and questioned here. The given examples refer to the paradoxical character within
a relatively stable context – namely medicine or psychotherapy. With the system
theoretician Niklas Luhmann however, one could argue that even within these
systems, stability is illusory and not guaranteed by any essential determination.2
But even Luhmann admits that the system of ‘religion’ in general3 and that of
‘mysticism’ in particular4 are fields in which the paradoxical character of mod-
ern systems as such becomes manifest in a paradigmatic way. This does not mean
that the developments in the history of spirituality influenced the genesis of
modern society in a causal way. It is rather the history of spirituality in which
the dilemma of emancipation and specialisation became manifest in its most
radical way, even before the problem was clearly recognised in other social and
cultural systems. In this contribution, the thesis will be presented that it is pre-
cisely the history of lived spirituality which enabled the radicalisation of the
dilemma – and therefore enabled modern rationality as such. Only the typical
western way in which the encounter with God developed and has been shaped,
enabled the observation and the fruitful elaboration of the fundamental paradox,
which becomes radically manifest in modern rationality. It follows from this thesis
that the theory of spirituality for which we are searching is a theory of science
and meaning sui generis, which explores experiences in the concrete spiritual life
in relation to human knowledge as such.5
This idea can only be partially explained. An appropriate approach to under-
stand the paradoxes of lived spirituality – and the ways in which they got their
concrete shapes – is the spirituality of the layman (idiota, laicus, illitterates), as
it was practiced and reflected in the tradition of the devotio moderna. The
representatives of this religious reform movement in the Netherlands – with a
great influence in Germany – at the end of the 14th and the first half of the 15th
2 See Niklas Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt a.M. 1997, 356.
3 See Niklas Luhmann, Die Religion der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt a.M. 2000, 185.
4 See Niklas Luhmann & Peter Fuchs, Reden und Schweigen, Frankfurt a.M. 2001. The identifi-
cation of ‘mysticism’ and ‘spirituality’ can be questioned. The way in which Luhmann and
Fuchs speak about mysticism however, justifies this identification. Likewise in the methodo-
logical study of Waaijman, we find a description of mysticism as the ‘logic of spirituality’. See
Kees Waaijman, Spirituality: Forms, foundations, methods, Leuven 2002, 53.
5 This does not mean that the exploration of this relation would be the only task of such a the-
ory. Inasmuch as we have to suppose that there is a history of lived spirituality, this discipline
also contains historical research on concrete experiences, on ways in which these are articulated
in texts – or even the experience that they cannot be articulated in texts – but also research in
the field of psychology and sociology of religion have to be integrated in such an elaborated the-
ory. These considerations, however important they are, are not discussed in this contribution.
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century, understood the concrete practical piety, also of not theologically edu-
cated ‘laymen’, as the starting point of a new paradigm of spiritual theology.
Shortly, it can be said that for important authors of the devotio moderna as Jean
Gerson, Gabriel Biel, Geert Groote, Gerard Zerbold of Zutphen or Thomas of
Kempen, the individual practice of an evangelical life, ‘imitating Christ’, could
be seen as the highest form of theory. In spite of the historical distance – or per-
haps thanks to it – we can ask whether the fundamental outline of this model
contributes to a better understanding of relevant concepts in the realm of spir-
ituality, in a context in which the layman plays a central role, as cultural reality
and as a metaphor for the ambiguity of the late modern society. Or is it rather
a matter of a coincidental resemblance of words, in which moreover the differ-
entiation between idiota, laicus and illitteratus seems to be forgotten?
In this contribution, we shall first analyse some parts of the De imitatione Christi
of Thomas of Kempen, in which the fundamental structure of the logic of the
layman will be shown. Thomas’ interpretation of the realm of interiority will
play a central role in this analysis (§2). Secondly, this concept of interiorisation
will be confronted with the perspective of the layman (idiota) as it can be found
in the work of the philosopher Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) who, as we know,
had very close historical relations with the movement of the Modern Devotion.
Although the works of Cusanus cannot be counted among the spiritual litera-
ture of this movement, there are many arguments to say that Cusanus attempted
to understand the anti-theoretical tendencies in life and thought of the followers
of the Modern Devotion (§3). Finally we shall present some systematic conclu-
sions that could form a point of departure for a theory of spirituality, which
takes into account the modern dilemma of the layman and possibly solves this.
2. THE EXTERIOR INTERIORITY OF THE LAYMAN – THE IMITATIO CHRISTI AS A
PARADIGM OF ‘CIVIL’ SPIRITUALITY
2.1. Historical developments
Many historians have, with good reasons, referred to the obvious relation between
the explosive development of pious religious movements in Late Middle Ages
and the gradual rise of the civil consciousness in the growing cities of the Low
Countries and the German Empire.6 The gradual transformation of feudal struc-
tures and the related monastic religious culture had consequences which were not
6 See f.i. Berndt Hamm, Bürgertum und Glaube: Konturen der städtischen Reformation, Göttingen
1996.
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limited to social, political or economical realms. On a religious level too, one was
searching for conceptual forms which would enable citizens without theological
education to live within the inner richness of the Christian faith. The fact that
these attempts were founded on the Gospel, in which Christ directed Himself
to the poor and powerless people, and to Augustine, has often been overlooked
in sociologically oriented historical analyses.7 The refined and ingenious philo-
sophical and theological models of Scholasticism were at this time experienced
as elitist and intellectualistic obstacles for citizens and craftsmen wanting to fol-
low the path of the faith.8 Until the Late Middle Ages, this problem was solved
by a strict hierarchical distinction between clergymen with a theological education
on the one hand, and layman who did not know Latin and who had no access
to the deep mysteries of faith on the other. There were people who, through edu-
cation and ordination – and mostly both – were able to speak (litterati) and
there were also people who, through lack of both, only could listen (illitterati).9
Petrus Lombardus, whose comments on the sententiae had a far reaching and
deep influence on almost all medieval intellectuals, made the distinction between
a reve-latio distincta, meant for superior minds, and the revelatio velata for the
simplices. Though these simple souls are, in the view of Peter, not able to under-
stand the articles of faith, they have at least to be able to believe them.10 In the
vision of Alain de Lille, faith had to be mediated by material metaphors and
images for these minores, who are not able to leave the domain of the senses.11
Thomas Aquinas too would express himself in a similar way.12
7 A very important exception is Anton G. Weiler, ‘Soziale und sozial-psychologische Aspekte der
devotio moderna’, in: Klaus Schreiner (Ed.), Laienfrömmigkeit im späten Mittelalter: Formen,
Funktionen, politisch-soziale Zusammenhänge, München 1988, 191-201. The complexity of his-
torical reality obliges to say that the rise of the individual consciousness in late medieval soci-
ety also originates in the Gospel and the tradition, founded on the Gospel. Therefore, the need
for religious reform is not only a consequence of dramatic social transformations, but also –
and perhaps primarily – its cause.
8 Klaus Schreiner, ‘Frömmigkeit von Eliten oder Frömmigkeit des Volkes?’, in: idem, Laienfröm-
migkeit im späten Mittelalter, 1-78.
9 The 13th century minorite Alexander of Bremen praised both the litterati, who were able to
talk, and the illitterati, who were able to listen: Alexander Minorita, Expositio in Apocalypsim
(Ed. A. Wachtel), Weimar 1955 (Quellen zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 1). Quotation
found in: Herbert Grundmann, ‘Litteratus – illitteratus: Der Wandel einer Bildungsnorm vom
Altertum zum Mittelalter’, in: idem, Ausgewählte Aufsätze, III: Bildung und Sprache, Stuttgart
1978, 38-54, esp. 45.
10 Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, tom. II, liber III et IV, Roma 1981, Liber III,
distinctio XXV, cap. 2 ‘De fide simplicium’, 154.
11 Alain de Lille (Alanus ab Insula), Summa de arte praedicatoria, Paris 1853 (Patrologia Latina
210), 184.
12 Summa Theologiae II, q.2, a.6‚ ‘Utrum omnes teneantur ad habendum fidem explicitam’.
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But after a while, this self-interpretation of Christian theoreticians, who were
situating themselves outside of the concrete, material actuality of human sorrows
and earthly political power relations, did not correspond with reality anymore.
In social and cultural practice, the distinction between clericus and laicus began
to shift more and more away from that between litteratus and illitteratus.
The identification between both distinctions however remained in a theoretical
way. Against the background of the Augustinian tension between the City of God
and the earthly empire – a tension which gave to medieval society its dynamic
unity13 – it was important to preserve the distinction between spiritual and
earthly citizens. At the same time, this opposition borrowed its dynamic char-
acter from its instable character (which resulted in far-reaching social conflicts
such as the conflict between pope and emperor). At stake was the boundary
between those who had received ordination and those who had not, which was
at stake, when one spoke of ‘laymen’. The implicit difference in (theological and
philosophical) education could in reality not always be identified with the dif-
ference between clergymen and laymen. The difficulty to define the state of the
layman, made the principle and normative boundary between litterati and illit-
terati vague and pervious.14 At the same time, the boundary between heavenly
theoria and earthly talking and acting, a boundary which enabled the litterati to
distinguish themselves from the practical illitterati, was continuously the subject
of theoretical reflection and was in that sense more and more questioned. The
abstract metaphysical reflections of scholastic thinking may have been intended
to comprehend the whole of reality in the light of a teleological order, but were
not (or sometimes did not want to be) able to realise the articulation of this
divine order. The visio Dei exceeded the intellectual powers even of the divine
citizens – the clergy – albeit that they were perhaps nearer to this goal than
craftsmen, merchants or politicians. The awareness of the provisional nature of
our thinking in relation to the highest theoria characterised even the most com-
prehensive scholastic ‘systems’15 and gained greater importance, not least under
13 See Inigo Bocken, ‘Katholieke democratie?’, in: Luc Sanders, Politiek voorbij de transcendentie
(pp. 114-123), Kapellen 2005.
14 ‘Der Umstand aber, daß der Traktat [of Gerard Zerbolt von Zutphen] in die Volkssprache
umgesetzt und dadurch auch ungelehrten Laien zugänglich wird, zeigt, dass die Laien nicht
mehr nur das passive, zu belehrende Gottesvolk sind, über dessen Seelenheil ein lateinisch-
wissenschaftlich gebildeter Klerikerstand wacht, ja, dass die Scheidung in clerici – litterati und
laici – illitterati den tatsächlichen Verhältnissen nicht mehr (und man könnte hinzufügen:
längst nicht mehr) gerecht wird’. (Volker Honemann, ‘Der Laie als Leser’, in: Schreiner,
Laienfrömmigkeit im späten Mittelalter, 238-247, 242).
15 ‘System’ has to be understood here in a broad sense. The thinking of people like Duns Scotus
was systematically organised and even has systematic meaning, but was no ‘system’ as it would
be later in the case in Idealistic philosophy or as it had been the case in the system of nature
in Eriugena’s philosophy.
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the influence of the Franciscan thinkers. The strict distinction between litterati
and illitterati increasingly lost its absolute character, and the awareness arose that
both theoretical educated subtle minds and the rough, simple faithful ones were
subject to the same conditions: both were ultimately bound by the limits of the
finite character of human speaking, which could never be directly deduced from
the divine word. In the so called nominalistic theological and philosophical sys-
tems, the idea that even the most abstract and refined articulations were subject
to the limiting conditions of human language – whether it was Latin or Middle
High German – became the focus of attention. The critical nominalistic idea
that even the most general concepts could not be understood as ideas of the
divine intellect, but only as ‘names’ produced by human intellect, was perhaps
an idea of epistemological value, but also had a clear social and spiritual mean-
ing. Ockham’s famous razor only had its clarifying effect because of the aware-
ness that arguments and concepts were primarily meant for human readers, who
thought and lived within the same intellectual and mental horizon as the writer
of the text.
This awareness had far-reaching consequences: theoretical oriented scholars
began to realise that their ideas and concepts had to be listened by practical-
living minores. At least, an increasing number of theological considerations were
accompanied by a reflection about the addressees of the spoken words. One of
the earliest and most spectacular examples of this evolution is Meister Eckhart
with his vernacular sermons. However, Meister Eckhart was not influenced by
nominalistic thinking.16 The awareness that the faith also, and perhaps prima-
rily, was meant for unlearned practical and simple people may have had a his-
tory which began earlier than the 14th century, but after the preaching of Meis-
ter Eckhart, this awareness got a new validity and started to play a role within
the academic theological and philosophical debates themselves. Important
theoreticians as Jean Gerson and Gabriel Biel began to understand that their
deep theological ideas and concepts had to be reformulated in such a way that
even less sophisticated minds would be able to realise them in their own lives.
There was, of course, still a gradual difference between theoretical scholars
and craftsmen, but this difference was no longer based on a different ontological
state. 
The famous church historian Berndt Hamm recently argued that the refor-
mulation of abstract theological ideas in order to make them understandable for
ordinary people came at a cost: the high degree of differentiation and complexity
which characterised the scholastic thinking, had to be given up for more concrete
16 See Wolfgang Göbel, Okzidentale Zeit: Die Subjektgeltung des Menschen im Praktischen nach der
Entfaltungslogik unserer Geschichte, Freiburg 1996, 168-194.
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and sometimes rough ideas.17 Hamm’s observation however is only partly cor-
rect. Inasmuch as the simplification of theory had been lead by a high degree of
reflexive consciousness about the role of speaker and listener, respectively reader,18
the complexity of the ‘theoretical’ – this means: ‘God seeing’ – processes was
transformed, rather than given up.19 In other words: it was not only the social
pressure ‘from outside’ – the increasing awareness of practical craftsmen and
traders in the context of the explosive development of the cities in late medieval
society – which forced theoretical minds to clarify and to simplify their theolog-
ical concepts. It was (at least: also) a transformation within theory itself, which
produced the realisation that reflections about the seeing of God had to be lis-
tened to or to be read and this not only by a divine hearer or reader. More and
more, the ‘layman’ became the paradigmatic character within theological reflec-
tions, because it was he, who lead the reflection of (at least some important)
theologians and philosophers. The transformation of theory was not in the first
place caused by laymen who began to claim the right to higher education or the-
ological knowledge; rather it were the litterati, becoming aware of the deeply
practical character of their arguments and beginning to search for theological and
philosophical criteria in practical piety. It should be obvious that not all theolo-
gians and philosophers of the time were involved in this process, but those who
continued to work according to the old theoretical – scholastic – paradigm, were
seen as representatives of an abstract and old-fashioned scholarship, which was
criticized by the reformers of the ‘theology of piety’.20
However, neither is it true that the transformations were primarily initiated
by the spiritual or intellectual elite. It was rather the complexity of the relation
between litterati and illitterati which was changing. This was not exclusively a
sociological process. The way of encountering God was changing. This encounter
was less experienced in theoretical articulations which are mediated by human
words. One became increasingly aware that human language is directed towards
other hearers, instead of understanding it as a direct and total representation of
the encounter with God. Though it is in language that human beings speak
about the encounter with God – about the divine word – this speaking is not
the Word itself. It is certain that all main scholastic theologians knew and under-
stood this difference. But this difference used to be interpreted as a shortcoming
17 Berndt Hamm, The reformation of faith in the context of late medieval theology and piety, Leiden
2004.
18 Hohnemann, ‘Der Laie als Leser’.
19 With the ‘theoretical processes’, I refer to the original meaning of ‘theorein’, the ‘seeing’ – namely
of God – as the original goal of every theory.
20 Berndt Hamm, ‘Normative centering in the 15th and 16th centuries: Observations on religiosity,
theology and iconology’, in: Hamm, The reformation of faith, 1-49, esp. 18.
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of language in relation to the divine reality. In the new vision, the difference
between human and divine word was not the last word, but rather the starting
point of the considerations. Due to this changed interpretation, human language
was seen in its own value, not anymore as the direct mediation of the divine
word, but as a medium to exchange thoughts with both laymen and specialists
about the inexpressible encounter with God. This can be seen in the growing
importance of sermons, which were held in vernacular in order to communicate
theological ideas and experiences in such a way, that they strengthen the faith
of the hearers. 
At least as important in this context however, is a concept which originates from
the main monastic traditions of the West: the collatio, the ‘collecting’ learning
discussion, in which both laymen and theological specialists took part. Collatio
(from the perfect form from ‘conferre’, to talk together, to collect) is a communal
learning discussion and refers to a meeting, where discussions about spiritual
subjects take place.21 The collatio differs from the disputatio, the classical form
of scholastic philosophical and theological learning and arguing. In a disputatio
the opponent has to be persuaded by way of arguments to accept an idea.22 Nei-
ther is the collatio a sermon, in which one interpretation is presented to the 
faithful listeners. The collatio, as it was further developed and refined in the
houses of the brothers and sisters of the devotio moderna, is a meeting in which
a contribution is expected from every individual participant. The changed rela-
tion between word, concept and truth – which found its expression in and was
reinforced by nominalistic theology and philosophy – led to another form of
encountering God. The speaker/writer, who gives words to his thinking,
does not articulate the divine word, but presents a word, which asks for further
explanations which are also articulated by words. In the course of the spiritual
discussion, the divine measure becomes manifest for the brothers and sisters.
None of the participants is allowed to claim this measure for him or her self.
Somehow the relations are reversed: while in the traditional model, one could
say that where God is, there concordance can be found; in the model of the col-
latio, God’s working power is only present where concordance is realised.23
21 See Waaijman, Spirituality, 785 and further.
22 See Tilman Borsche, ‘Reden unter Brüdern: Diskurstheoretische Bedingungen der Konkor-
danz bei Nikolaus von Kues’, in: Inigo Bocken (Ed.), Conflict and reconciliation: Perspectives
on Nicholas of Cusa, Leiden 2004, 5-24.
23 In this sense, this model has also far-reaching political consequences, as can be seen in the
reform movement of Counciliarism, in the same time as the devotio moderna. This movement
intended to reduce the primacy of the pope and to give more power to the Council. In the
assembly has to be searched for the divine measure, with which the Church has to be led. The
Council of Basel (1430-1432) was the scene where both models – the collation-model and the
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The reference to the collatio shows clearly that in addition to the social com-
munal character of the new model, we have to define a second important concept
in order to characterize the late medieval transformation of spiritual conscious-
ness: internalisation. Whereas scholastic theoreticians were able to interpret reality
from the distance of the monk’s cell – or the academic desk, which was in fact
inherited from the former – now the ‘theologians of piety’ seemed to take into
account concrete experiences of the illitterati and the idiotae in theory itself as
an autonomous ‘measure’ – principle of order – with which theory can be judged.
‘Exteriorisation’ of the social dimension parallels the ‘internalisation’ of the
concrete form of life in the ‘theoretical processes’. The perspective of the layman
is not longer outside the world of the litteratus but has become an essential part
of it. The now ‘simplified’ theological ideas can and must be internalised in the
concrete form of life of the faithful readers and listeners. In the learning discus-
sion of the collatio, it was not the word itself which had to be internalised (as if
it would be perfectly true). It was rather the difference of word and truth which
can be internalised by the brothers and sisters of the devotio moderna. They are
neither only speaker, nor only listener, but both at the same time. In the tension
between speaker and hearer, they come to understand the divine measure of life.
Every individual repeats the whole communal process. The common searching
and finding is at the same time the most individual searching and finding. This
internalisation as such is not new. To enter the inner essence of things was already
the eldest task of theoria. This was already the case in Plato and Aristotle and
the whole tradition which was built on these thinkers. But now, internalisation
got a new meaning. 
The ‘new’ paradigm is not less complex than the subtle scholastic systems. But
the way in which this complexity is manifesting itself has changed. In order to
better understand the paradoxical complexity of this new paradigm, we shall
now direct our attention to the most influential representative of the devotio
moderna, Thomas of Kempen and his famous book Imitatio Christi. In no other
movement of late medieval society, both aspects – community (Brothers of the
Common Life) and internalisation – are so closely connected as in the devotio
moderna.
traditional hierarchical model – conflicted. An important participant and witness of these dis-
cussions was Nicholas of Cusa. In his writing De concordantia catholica, Cusanus attempts
to give a foundation to the counciliaristic position. In order to give this foundation, he uses
arguments which can be understood in terms of the collation: where there is concordance,
there is God, and not vice versa. See Nicholas of Cusa, De concordantia catholica I,XII; See:
Anton G. Weiler, ‘Nicholas of Cusa on harmony, concordance, consensus and acceptance as
categories of reform in the Church in De concordantia catholica’, in: Bocken, Conflict and recon-
ciliation, 62-78.
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2.2. Imitatio Christi and theory
2.2.1. Common individuality
At first sight, the social dimension of spiritual life seems to be rather absent in
the Imitatio Christi, which was written between 1420 and 1441 and edited by
Thomas of Kempen.24 This work, which has paradigmatic meaning for the spir-
itual movement of the devotio moderna, is characterised by a very intimate atmos-
phere. It is addressed to an individual reader who intends to follow the way of
faith. Instructions are given to those who want to practice evangelical virtues and
to live a humble life. Thomas continuously advises his reader to look for silence
and solitude and, if possible, also to avoid the presence of friends.25
In the third book, chapter 42, Thomas warns his reader never to find peace
on other people, but rather on truth. Thomas’ reader seems to be a monk look-
ing for solitude, rather than a social being trying to search for a common insight
and ready to be questioned by others. The second book, which is dedicated to
the interior life, is very clear about this: to follow and imitate Christ, we never
can build on other human beings (II,1,12). 
Where in these explicit and omnipresent instructions for a lonesome and
retired life is the social and common dimension, which we mentioned in the
last paragraph? In the following we will show that the paradox of an (external)
discussion and the tendency to interiority, which is given with the forms of
preaching and thinking of the collatio,26 can also be found in the Imitatio Christi.
For, although the need for earthly solitude and moderation belongs to the cen-
tral themes of this book, the form in which these themes are presented by the
author seems to speak a different language. The book does not offer a theoretical
exposé ‘from the outside’ concerning the path of inner life and the imitation of
Christ, but is speaking ‘from the inside’: the author seems to be situated in a
circle of readers and hearers. He addresses his instructions to his readers quite
personally; sometimes he is using the first person plural, as if he wants to show
the shared conditions with which we, human beings, live and out of which we want
to follow Christ.
But there is another element stressing the social and communicative aspects
of his theory: the author has a pastoral attitude, but shows – at least in books I
24 See Hans-Norbert Jankowski, Geert Groote, Thomas von Kempen und die devotio moderna,
Freiburg i.B. 1978: some authors are of the opinion that the Imitatio Christi was not really writ-
ten by Thomas of Kempen but by another author, perhaps Geert Grote.
25 ‘Maximi Sanctorum humana consortia ubi poterant vitabant et Deo in secreto servire eligebant.
Dixit quidam: Quotiens inter homines fui, minor homo redii. […] Qui igitur intendit ad inte-
riora et spiritualia pervenire, oportet eum cum Iesu a turba declinare. […] Qui ergo se abstrahit
a notis et amicis, approximabit illi Deus cum Angelis sanctis’ (I, 20).
26 Borsche, ‘Reden unter Brüdern’, 23.
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and II – that he lives in the same horizon as his readers whom he encourages and
exhorts. He is interchanging the use of ‘you’ and ‘we’ and shows that he
himself is involved in the process. In books III and IV the tone changes. The imi-
tation of Christ and the stress on inner life remain central themes, but the mode
with which the author expresses these themes is different. The text does not speak
anymore of ‘you’ and ‘we’, but of the ‘lord’ (dominus) and his ‘servant’ (servus)
instead. The ‘imitation’ now becomes a dialogue between the faithful and the
Christ, whom he wants to follow. In a certain sense, the third book describes the
communion between the faithful and Christ as a dialogical event. The fourth book
consists of the dialogue between God who is communicating and the disciple (dis-
cipulus) who now is prepared to receive this announcement, the Word of God. We
do not know whether these four books are intentionally composed as described
here. However, it is certain that the perspective of the author is gradually chang-
ing. The imitation is a process in which the common horizon and the most indi-
vidual intimacy are deeply interwoven. The ‘common’ is finally directed towards
this most intimate process of human self-becoming, and on the other hand, this
process of becoming oneself can only be realised and supported by the commu-
nicative process which becomes manifest in the tension of ‘you’ and ‘we’.27
The author speaks personally to the reader since he lives and thinks against the
same background (‘we’). This means that the author, in contrast to the scholas-
tic theologian or philosopher, never can express an ultimate, final word, through
which the unity with God can be realised. The words are not so much directed
towards their own meaning, but intend to follow the path of faith of the reader.
The words only become true inasmuch as the different individual readers con-
cretely realise what words express. The summit of theory within the framework
of the Imitatio Christi is therefore the practice of the imitation of the evangelical life
of Christ itself. Already the first chapter of the book (entitled as De imitatione
Christi et contemptu omnium vanitatum mundi) contains a brilliant program-
matic beginning. The words of the author, addressed to his reader and exhort-
ing a practical life in the spirit of the gospel, are a comment on the words of
Christ Himself, from the Gospel of St. John: ‘He that followth me, shall not walk
in darkness’. (John 8,12). These words exhort us to follow the attitude of Christ
and to imitate his actions. Only thus, can we reach the light and can we be freed
from the blindness of our heart.28 With this reference to the Scripture, Thomas
shows very clearly that the goal of the Imitatio Christi is finally the same as that
27 Rudolf Th. M. van Dijk, ‘De “Navolging van Christus” als concept voor de geestelijke weg:
De relevante plaats van het derde en vierde boek’, in: Ons Geestelijk erf 77 (2003), 43-92.
28 ‘Haec sunt verba Christi, quibus admonemur quatenus vitam eius et mores imitemur, si velimus
veraciter illuminari et ab omni caecitate cordis liberari’ (I,1,2).
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of the scholastic theoretical writings. However, this doctrina Christi exceeds all
other holy theories, precisely inasmuch as its perfection consists in action. ‘Theory’
can only be realised inasmuch as the reader/listener understands his whole life in the
light of this path and acts according to this understanding.29 The understanding
of the words can only take place in a concrete, ‘incarnated’ and personal practice.
The primacy of lived practice over theory as it is stressed by Thomas already in
the first chapters (‘I prefer to experience repentance, in stead of knowing its def-
inition’),30 is no simple rejection of words, but implies a different way of deal-
ing with knowledge which is mediated by words. Words get another ‘function’:
they are spurring and questioning and as such, they refer towards a reality beyond
the concrete words. However, they do not refer to any kind of secret knowledge
which exceeds the power of the high abstract concepts, as often seemed to be
assumed in scholastic mystical and hierarchical theology, but to a reader, who is
addressed by this word and is called to action. The text of the Imitatio Christi
finds its meaning in this common process of communication in which author
and reader (respective speaker and listener) are involved. And in still another
sense the words transcend their own power: the hearer is not asked to conform
himself to the expressed words. He is invited to direct his attention to the word
that is the real and proper measure of action, the word of Christ itself. The text
does not impose a measure, which has to be accepted passively by the reader.
In the process of reading, it becomes clear that writer and reader are both and
commonly subject to the same divine measure and that it is a whole life long
(‘totam vitam’) impossible to escape this measure. Thomas explains this, when
he asks the reader to think about the need for humility: he, who uses words
without humility, displeases the triune God (‘displiceas Trinitati’, I,1,7). The
impossibility to escape this divine measure constitutes the basis for the personal
responsibility to follow and imitate Christ, with which every single reader is con-
fronted. As such it is also the basis of the individual and intimate character of
this path of imitation. To follow this path means for the reader the attempt to
understand all the elements of his life in the light of this divine measure. 
One does not have to be a specialist in medieval philosophical literature to
understand that the Imitatio Christi belongs to another genre than the theolog-
ical and philosophical treatises of the medieval academic tradition. However, the
intention of the work would be misjudged and underestimated if this difference
would be seen as absolute. We may ask why the author, who in his many quotes
29 ‘Doctrina Christi omnes doctrinas Sanctorum praecellit; et qui spiritum haberet, absconditum
ibi manna inveniret. […] Qui autem vult plene et sapide Christi verba intelligere, oportet ut
totam vitam suam illi studeat conformare’ (I,1,4/6).
30 ‘Opto magis sentire compunctionem quam scire eius definitionem’ (I,1,9).
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from philosophical and theological writings shows himself thoroughly acquainted
with academic traditions, has chosen this literal form and how this form is related
to scholastic theoretical concepts.31 There can be no doubt that these academic the-
ories form the background against which Thomas explains his ways of dealing
with knowledge, speaking and acting, which becomes manifest in the continu-
ously returning (critical) remarks about ‘the philosophers’ and earthly erudition.
Time and again, he reprimands and criticises the vanity of learned philosophers.
This vanity is an obstacle on the way towards the conformation with Christ (I,1,6),
this means: the divine measure of the own, personal life. For Thomas, there is no
doubt that a humble farmer (humilis rusticus) is better suited for the spiritual life
than a vain philosopher, who ‘forgets his soul when he investigates the movements
of the stars’.32 Although Thomas concedes to Aristotle that the desire for knowl-
edge belongs to the nature of human being, he directly and extensively adds that
theoretical science and knowledge belong to the external affairs of life and that they
as such do not contribute anything to the interior way, the last and ultimate goal
of this existence, which finds its full expression in the conformation with Christ.33
In the strictly, modern sense of the word, the Imitatio Christi is of course no ‘theo-
retical’ writing. However, our above reflections show that Thomas intended a trans-
formation of theory in the sense of a vision of God. This ‘theory’ contains the aware-
ness that all our deeds, as well as our words and thoughts, can (and must) be measured
with the divine measure. Only in this measuring, we find their real meaning. Even
our most abstract thoughts cannot articulate this measure. Even these are subject to
it. Theory is a vision which comprehends our whole life (tota vita) and as such it never
can be totally explored by our thoughts. This theory can only be lived in an individ-
ual manner, namely inasmuch gradually more and more elements of our life can be
judged in the light of this divine measure. This judgement never can be claimed by
human beings, neither by the author of the text or the thinker of thoughts. Still, in
the dialogue between the author of the text and his reader, the obstacles which hin-
der the working of this divine measure, can be discovered. This becomes manifest in
the appeal of Thomas to be taught by ‘truth’ in stead of human words. 
He is happy whom the truth teaches itself, not by figures or passing words, but as
it is in itself. Our opinion and our senses often deceive us. […] What would help
31 Charles M.A. Caspers, ‘Thomas van Kempen en de communie: Een situering van het vierde
(oorspronkelijk derde) boek van De imitatione Christi in de geschiedenis van de vroomheid’,
in: Ons Geestlijk Erf 77 (2003), 93-124.
32 ‘Melior est profecto humilis rusticus, qui Deo servit, quam superbus philosophus qui se neglecto
cursum caeli considerat’ (I,2,2).
33 ‘Omnis homo naturaliter scire desiderat; sed scientia sine timore Dei quid importat?’ (I,2,1).
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us a stream of words about hidden things, for which we do not account because
we do not know them?34
We have to give space to theory (in the sense of theorein) in order to understand
our life in the perspective of this divine measure. Then we are able to integrate
our personal life in a process of theorein, in order to become conformed with this
measure. We have to free ourselves from the words of human beings, even those
of the writer of the Imitatio, in order to hear the one divine word in which
everything is expressed. It is here that we are able to understand the intrinsic rela-
tion between the ‘social’ and the ‘individual’, which characterizes the book from
its first pages onwards. 
In the following paragraph we shall present two opposite concepts, which clar-
ify this ‘theory’ in terms of a process in which ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ on the one
hand and ‘sociality’ and ‘individuality’ on the other, can grow into a concrete unity.
First of all we shall discuss the opposition between ‘darkness’ and ‘light’, which
is elaborated in Book I (2.2.2.). Secondly we shall explicate the opposition
between ‘exteriority’ and ‘interiority’ as it can be found in Book II (2.2.3.). 
2.2.2. The concrete way from darkness into light
The Imitation of Christ refers to a way, which is described by Thomas as a process
within a continuous field of tensions between opposites: rusticus and philoso-
phus, doing and thinking, earthly vanity and spiritual humility, word and truth
etc. In this process, human beings are called to liberate themselves from every
dependency on human perspectives – on the senses, also at the same time on the
plurality of human thoughts and judgements.35 Not only the mental thoughts
have to be liberated from their material elements – following the logic of Pla-
tonism – but even more, the listening to the Divine Word has to be freed from
thoughts and concepts. It is the Divine Word, which is able to make our con-
crete existence (which includes our thinking) understandable and transparent.
However, this understanding is not the objective knowledge from a distance,
as it can be found in scholastic theory. In that old paradigm, the knower
remained ‘outside’ of what is known. Reality was analysed in its objective teleo-
34 ‘Felix quem veritas per se docet, non per figuras et voces transeuntes, sed sicuti se habet. Nos-
tra opinio et noster sensus saepe nos fallit et modicum videt. Quid prodest magna cavillatio
de occultis et obscuris rebus de quibus nec arguemur in iudicio, quia ignoravimus?’ (I,3,1-3).
35 Here we can see a direct line from Augustine’s Confessions towards the devotio moderna. The
conversation between Augustin and his mother Monica in the 9th Book shows the same ambi-
guity of silence and speaking as can be found in the Imitatio Christi. The dialogue-partners are
not silent themselves, but their speaking becomes more and more silent. See Johann Kreutzer,
Pulchritudo Dei: Vom Erkennen Gottes bei Augustin, München 1995, 255-272.
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logical structure, oriented towards God. The goal of this theoretical concept was
to articulate the measure with which this analysis could be made, even though
the greatest minds of Scholasticism were very well aware of the final unreachable
character of this theoretical ideal. This concept is not absent in the ‘new para-
digm’ of the Imitatio Christi, but it is situated in a different context of arguments.
The attempt to make transparent reality in general and our concrete life in par-
ticular, could not longer be realised by the theoretician, but had to be left to the
Divine Word, which never can be claimed by any human being.
The author of the Imitatio gives ‘thinking’ another role: he starts dialogue
and conversation and tries to remove obstacles, in order to enable his dialogue
partners (his readers) to walk from the darkness into the light; this means: in
order to be directed towards Gods judgement.36 Darkness and light are both
poles which constitute the fundamental tension in the first Book of the Imi-
tatio. ‘Light’ is defined by Thomas as the ‘humble self-knowledge as a way to
God, which is more fundamental than the search for the treasures of knowl-
edge’.37 Darkness means the plurality which manifests itself both in knowl-
edge and in action. Living in darkness in the view of Thomas means to place
his hope in human beings and creatures.38 The task we have to fulfill, accord-
ing to Thomas, is the ‘collecting’ of all elements found in this life – whether
these are external things in reality or thoughts in our mind – around the meas-
ure of God’s Word.39
For Thomas, light is never undividedly present in human life. It is always
mixed with darkness. The idea that we can reach the undivided light in this
life is one of the illusions from which we are to be liberated. We are never able
to reach a pure ‘theory’, a pure vision. No way of thinking can escape the con-
ditions of human existence. Human thinking is involved in reality, with all its
finitude and dependency. We are of necessity bound to human perspectives
(II,6,2-22). In the view of Thomas, human beings live with the unavoidable
permanent danger to mistake something which is dark for light: often we think
to act out of love, while we only experience simple natural desire (I,15,9). The
dependency on human (and creaturely) things cannot be extinguished: we can-
not speak without words, not see without eyes. When we think about the
whole of all things, we can only do this as beings, who live and move between
36 ‘Nam homo proponit, sed Deus disponit, nec est in homine via eius’ (I,19,9).
37 ‘Humilis tui cognitio certior via est ad Deum quam profunda scientiae inquisitio’ (I,3,22).
38 ‘Vanus est qui spem suam ponit in hominibus aut in creaturis’ (I,7,1).
39 This ‘colligere’ is praised by Thomas again and again: I,19,15; I,23,30; I,23,43; II,1,33;
IV,1,27; III,48,24.
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darkness and light. Therefore we have to abstain as much as possible from
passing judgements on others.40
Thomas refers here to the evangelical idea that who judges others, judges in
fact only himself. However, surprisingly enough it is here that Thomas discov-
ers the possibility to find a way out of the darkness of the involvement into
earthly things. It is, as we have seen before, impossible to leave this network of
dependencies and to reach a global vision of the order of being. But it is possi-
ble to know this impossibility since we are able to know that we cannot trust
the judgement of our reason. In other words, it is possible to judge ourselves.
This does not mean that we can know (in empirical and psychological sense)
who we exactly are. But we are able to recognise that we live in darkness at
the moment that we mistake our judgements for the final word about reality.
We are able to discover that our judgements throw the shadows which hide the
light. However, for the same reason it is through the shape of these shadows
that we can see the contours of the light of the divine judgement. 
The question now is how Thomas understands this precisely. How can we find
this light that our finite and dependent judgements limit in the darkness of
the worldly network of dependencies in which we continuously are misled?41 In
Chapter 12 of the first Book, Thomas shows us where this concrete turning
point can be found. ‘It is good for us’, Thomas says, ‘to meet with stiff opposi-
tions and adversities. They make us understand how much we live in exile and
teach us not to place hope in earthly affairs’.42 The attacks on reason, which we
find throughout the Imitatio, do not exclude that we have the possibility and
even the duty to use our reason well. In conflicts and opposition we are able to
learn our place in the whole of things, however not in the ‘objective’ sense of
the word. Out of the knowledge that our life is moving between darkness and
light, reason shows us in which way we ourselves are involved in these conflicts
and opposition. It is the fact that we mistake our word for truth, which keeps
us away from seeing the real measure of all things.
This realisation about ourselves is the moment on which the imitation of
Christ really can start. It is the moment that we can observe the light – as a
40 ‘Ad te ipsum oculos reflecte et aliorum facta caveas iudicare. In iudicando alios homo frustra
laborat, saepius errat et leviter peccat; seipsum vero iudicando et discutiendo semper fructuose
laborat’ (I,14,1-2).
41 ‘Sed saepe aliquid ab intra latet, vel etiam ab extra concurrit, quod nos etiam pariter trahit’
(I,14,5).
42 ‘Bonum nobis est, quod aliquando habeamus aliquas gravitates et contrarietates; quia saepe
hominem ad cor revocant, quatenus se in exilio esse cognoscat nec spem suam in aliqua re mundi
ponat’ (I,12,1).
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spark43 – in the darkness and are able to follow it. It is the moment that the
‘collecting’ (colligere) can start, not the collecting of things around our own
measure, but the collecting of ourselves in all contradictions and conflicts in which
we are involved through all our dependencies. And there is a plurality of opin-
ions and doctrines possible. The same fact can sometimes be seen as ‘dark’,
sometimes as ‘light’ and sometimes both at the same time. Everyone is always
ready with a quick judgement: ‘Often enough, quarrel arises between friends
and citizens, between monks and pious people, because of the plurality of opin-
ions and points of view’.44
According to Thomas, it is very difficult to discard familiar opinions. But if
we understand that every word causes other words, we are able to leave behind
our own words and let speak the measure of light, which begins to show itself
in the chaos of contradictions, if and when we direct our attention to our own
responsibility. Nothing is left but to arrange our own existence and to search for
the measure which resolves the inner conflicts in which we are involved.
2.2.3. The interior exteriority
Thomas has explained what it means to live in darkness, but he also marked the
point where a turn towards the light is possible and where we can begin to fol-
low the way, which will bring our dark existence into clarity. It is not primarily
the ‘uncertainty’ of our judgements (as later in the Cartesian philosophy) which
was the main problem for Thomas. It is rather his observation that every judge-
ment itself may be subject to another judgement. Every measure we use can be
‘measured’ itself. He who judges will be judged himself. The light which comes
to shine in every judgement is accompanied by a shadow. Thomas realised that
human beings never can get out of this network of judging and being judged.
It was vanity of scholastic scholars, theologians and philosophers to claim a posi-
tion outside of this field of dependencies. They studied the stars, but forgot their
own soul, as Thomas wrote in the beginning of the first book (I,2,2). They were
stuck on their own judgements and ideas, and thus they were dependent on
material goods and earthly glory.
The way of clarification does not ask for a renounce from the senses in order
to make mental judgements. The centre of darkness has to be searched on a
more fundamental level. The path of clarification does not demand that we
foreswear the senses or concrete experience, it is a way out of the involvement
43 ‘O qui scintillam haberet verae caritatis, profecto omnia terrena sentiret plena fore vanitatis’
(I,15,14).
44 ‘Propter diversitatem sensuum et opinionum satis frequenter oriuntur dissensiones inter 
amicos et cives, inter religiosos et devotos’ (I,14,9).
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of the dependencies of judgements. The clarification can not be realised by a
judgement from the outside of worldly relations, for he who judges, is already
involved in these concrete relations. The path from darkness into light – the
clarification of our place in the whole of all things – starts with a complete
change of our perspective, for we have the ability to understand the dependency
with which we live by judging. If we understand that we mistake darkness for
light, we started our way out.45 By way of this consciousness we can deal with
our judgements in a different way. It is not possible for us to escape judgements
which are given with our life on earth. But we can make our judgements in such
a way, that we tidy away as much as possible the obstacles which hinder the
light which already shines in and through the judgements. 
Through a second central pair of oppositions, that of exteriority and interiority,
Thomas explains what this precisely means. This opposition can not be seen
in an absolute way, but Thomas describes it as a process of internalisation.
He makes a distinction between an interior and an exterior judgement. ‘He,
who lives from the inside and confers only little value to external things, has no
need of pious exercises and devotion’.46 Thomas refers to the goal which can be
reached by the right inner judgement. This goal can not be reached by impos-
ing the measure of our judgement on reality. We have to sharpen the measure
with which we live and judge in the network of all relations, on the measure
which is at work already in reality: ‘He, who takes everything as it is and not as
it has been named or valued, is truly wise and learned, however, more in the view
of God than in the view of the people’.47 The measure of our judgement has to
be measured with the measure of all things in reality. Only in such a way, we
find the trace of the real, final measure, the judgement of God, which is the final
order of reality in which we live. To live oriented towards this final measure,
which can not be subject to our own judgements, means to ‘collect’ the things
in reality around his own measure, which is questioned again and again in the
confrontation with the things around us. 
The way which Thomas presents here, implies for us the need to accept the
challenge of conflicts in the world. This is the only way to escape them and to
45 Thomas stresses that the continuous changing of light and darkness is no reason to give up
the attempts to search for the light: ‘Non est totum perditum quando res accidit in contrarium’
(III, 30,21).
46 ‘Qui ab intra scit ambulare, et modicum ab extra res ponderare, non requirit loca, nec exspectat
tempora ad habenda devota exercitia’ (II,1,32).
47 ‘Cui sapiunt omnia prout sunt, non ut dicuntur aut aestimantur: hic vere sapiens est et doctus
magis a Deo quam ab hominibus’ (II,1,31).
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internalise the final judgement which encloses all oppositions as our judgement.48
The old paradigm of theory meant searching from the outside to a measure
which would be able to resolve and to stabilise the conflicts and oppositions of
reality. For it, scholastic theory had to find shelter in more abstract concepts and
distinctions, which had to overcome the resistance of phenomena and judgements,
and reached such a level of abstraction that they could easily be characterised and
unveiled as a flatus vocis.
Although modern philosophers like Thomas Hobbes understood their think-
ing as radical break with scholastic theory, they took over this theoretical claim
of a position outside of conflicts, now however as ‘political theory’, which intro-
duced with the ‘sovereign’ an external principle that was able to reconcile social
and political oppositions. The ‘practical’ theory of Thomas of Kempen goes in
another direction, that of internalisation. It does not suppose a position outside
of conflicts, but transforms these into the inner conflict of the individual. It is
not the reality ‘outside’ him which now is internalised, as this would be the case
in the later modern subject theories. It is rather so that the devout person enters
the conflicts and accepts the questioning of his own judgements, knowing that
in this conflict more comprehensive measure will become manifest, which will
give him orientation and which will enable him to live in peace with himself and
with other persons and things around him. The internalisation is therefore a
paradoxical process. The devout person is searching for the internal measure of
things and people. It is the plurality of opinions and judgements which has to
be resolved.49 As such, the internalisation is at the same time a way out, out of
the prison of one’s own judgement, which always is subject to other judgements.
The more one is directed towards the things as they are in themselves, the more
one will learn to know one’s ‘real’ measure, which is not subject to continuous
changing and confusion. This measure is not a fixed ‘essence’, but is a living
measure. For, fixed measures are judgements which can be judged by others. 
Real interiority is not at all a subjective reflection which implies an abandoning
of the external world. The pious person discovers in himself the union of the
internal and the external. This is true interiority, which never can be other than
a ‘practical’ interiority. However, as such it is not contrary to theory. Rather,
Thomas intends to analyse the practical character of judgements inasmuch as
these are related to the whole of life (tota vita). Theoretical thinking which before
48 ‘Esto itaque expeditus ad pugnam si vis habere victoriam. Sine certamine non potes venire ad
patientiae coronam. […] Sine labore non tenditur ad requiem; nec sine pugna pervenitur ad
victoriam’ ( III,19,14-15,18).
49 ‘Non es sanctior si laudaris; nec vilior si vituperaris. Quod es, hoc es; nec maior dici vales
quam Deo teste sis’ (II,6,18-19).
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had been expressed in syllogisms and proofs, now gets its shape in practical acting.
Theory – the vision of the essential – never can be realised from outside, it can
only be developed within the complex relations of human acting, which is char-
acterised by judgements. 
Theory has become practice and practice becomes theory inasmuch as the act-
ing thinker succeeds in letting fully shine the light which is already present in
earthly relations, but which is often darkened by human judgements. This means
that the judgements, which are expressed in action, have to be realised in such a
way that they become transparent for the light of the ultimate measure of all things.
The person following the path of the Imitatio, has to find the right measure
between speaking and silence, judging and being judged. This ‘right middle’ con-
nects two poles of the tension field in which man lives his life. Thomas is convinced
of the fact that this ‘right middle’ never can be reached or fixed by thinking, that
is: judging from the outside. The true and real measure can only be realised inas-
much as man knows that he himself is involved in this process of judging. 
The theoretical model which is characterised by two tension fields – that of
darkness and light at the one hand and that of exteriority and interiority at the
other – supposes that the person who judges is always involved in that which he
is judging. As such, this model does not offer a comprehensive theory, but it con-
tains a hermeneutical frame in which one can learn to deal with real things as
well as with texts. The criticism of the devotio moderna against scholastic method
was based on the observation that these thinkers remained outside the order
they wanted to judge. The theoretical practice of the Imitatio Christi intends to
relate human measure with the divine order, without the certainty that they are
identified. This theory encourages us to work on the transformation of the
human measure in order to make it conformable to the divine measure. In this
perspective this model can indicate how the follower of Christ can deal with texts.
Texts offer words and the Imitatio calls for an awareness of the fact that these
words are read by a reader. With this awareness, it becomes manifest that these
words are not the ultimate Word itself. This Word starts to shine at the moment
that the reader starts to be aware of the interplay between writer and reader.50
2.3. The theoretical practice of the Imitatio Christi 
Although the Imitatio Christi is in the first place a book of meditation, written
to serve the daily path of devotion, the way Thomas describes this path is
50 ‘Possunt quidem verba sonare, sed spiritum non conferunt. Pulchriter dicunt, sed te tacente
cor non accendunt. Litteras tradunt, sed tu sensum aperis. Mysteria proferunt, sed tu reseras
intellectum signatorum’ (III,2, 6-8).
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characterised by a refined and highly developed theoretical consciousness. Not
only can the attentive reader discover implicit references to and discussions with
classical theoretical models between the lines,51 but it is also the reflective and
intellectual power and the radical integrity that make the work one of the most
read books of Western history. Because this work found its use mostly in con-
texts of practical piety, its theoretical content has been recognized little in a cul-
ture where the dichotomy between elitist science and popular practices remained
effective until deep into the 20th century. The Imitatio Christi is not only a book
which intends to translate subtle and abstract theological and philosophical con-
cepts into a more everyday language. 
For Thomas, theory has to penetrate reality. Theory is not longer exclusively
meant for the Divine Reader – who has certainly no lack of self knowledge!
Theory has a liberating role, inasmuch as it is able to break open and to enlighten
the narrow human vision which is darkened by rigid judgements. Also the later
‘modern’ political thinkers (f.i. Hobbes, Locke) would claim such liberation from
the narrowing illusion to understand the order of reality.52 In this tradition how-
ever, the ordo of the divine measure was marginalised. In this view the solving
of conflicts in society had to be imposed and forced by self interested subjects.
The liberation which is intended by the Imitatio Christi has another goal
(II,10,7). Thomas shows his readers a way which enables them to listen to the
divine word. The individual way of living in reality can gain a divine character
itself, if the faithful succeeds in liberating himself from the narrowing and nar-
rowed human judgements. Theory is not only that which has to be exteriorised
in reality, but has to be internalised at the same time in the personal practice,
which for the devotio moderna is the locus veritatis. 
This inner, enlightning measure cannot be shaped by escaping the conflicts and
oppositions of our existence. Later this would become the strategy of political the-
ories in modern time. He who follows the way of Christ is able to enter the con-
flict,53 and has the capacity to confront his own judgement with other judgements.
In this capacity, the one living measure becomes visible. The conversation, which
is expressed in the thinking form of the collatio, is the space in which this process
can be developed. He, who enters this conversation, is able to become, with his
whole life, this word itself, with which God is wordlessly speaking. 
The task of this theory consists in the critical investigation of our human judge-
ments. The theory is able to unmask us at the moment that we mistake external
51 One could Thomas, respectively Geert Grote, who is perhaps the author of the text, call a
‘mysticus doctus’ in analogy with the ‘pictor doctus’.
52 See Robert Spaemann, Glück und Wohlwollen, Versuch über Ethik, 2nd ed., Stuttgart 1998.
53 ‘Eligendum est magis totum mundum habere contrarium quam Iesum offensum’ (II,8,20).
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fame or comfort, for real knowledge. We are never certain about this. The way
into the light therefore never can be a necessary dialectical process, but needs a
clear attention for the seductions of the external world. What is ‘internal’ or
‘external’ is not definitively fixed. The most concrete practice can be more spir-
itual than the most subtle spiritual reflection. But it can also be the other way
around. The Imitation is a way which has to be started again and again. No one
can become a specialist in this field. Therefore, the lecture of the Imitatio Christi
seems to give the concept of ‘layman’ a new, inner dimension. The distinction
between ordained priest and a citizen without theological background is not the
main problem in the view of Thomas. Nevertheless, he delivers criteria for an
authentic priesthood. But these criteria, which are described in terms of inter-
nalisation, are the same for craftsmen and citizens as for theologians. Measured
with the measure of God, all are laymen. 
In the next paragraph we will refer shortly to a philosopher who was – at least his-
torically – near to the devotio moderna: Nicholas of Cusa. Cusanus seems to have
seen the theoretical dimension of the ‘layman’ and developed it further in his phi-
losophy of the layman as an idiota. More explicit than Thomas did, Cusanus brings
the layman into dialogue with philosophical and theological tradition. As such,
Cusanus seems to present arguments for the paradigmatic meaning of the layman
for theoretical thinking: reflection becomes concrete, theory is penetrating reality. 
3. THE LAYMAN AND THE PHILOSOPHER
Several recent historical studies have been already dedicated to the (ambiguous)
relation between Nicholas of Cusa and the lay movement of the devotio moderna.54
Although Nicholas may not have studied at the Latin School of the Brothers of
Common Life in Deventer – as was assumed till recently – it is certain that he
had direct contact with representatives of this movement during his lifetime.
Without any doubt, the figure of the layman (idiota) which Cusanus put on
stage in three dialogues, written in 1450, can be seen as a reference to the cen-
tral role of laymen in this movement. 
In his Idiota de mente (The layman on mind) Cusanus sketches a dialogue
between a simple spoon-maker and a learned philosopher, one of the most
famous of his time, who seems to know Aristotle and Plato extensively. Although
the spoon-maker has never read any books, he is clearly the leading person in
the conversation and shows more wisdom and understanding than the learned
philosopher does. The role of the philosopher is limited to some admiring philo-
54 E.g. Nikolaus Staubach, ‘Cusanus und die devotio moderna’, in: Bocken, Conflict and
Reconciliation, 31-56.
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sophical comments about the deep wisdom of the layman, relating his remarks
to concepts of philosophical tradition. In another dialogue, Idiota de sapientia
(The layman on wisdom) Cusanus critically remarks through the mouth of the
layman that people who read many books, are in danger to be bound like a foal
to the manger of traditional texts,55 a remark which is clearly in line with Thomas’
criticism on philosophers and learned scholars. These people are so busy with
their books and their intellectual constructions, that they do not recognise any
more divine truth in the external world. Truth and wisdom are not to be found
in dark and forgotten corners but ‘cry in all streets and on all markets’.56
Nevertheless, the perspective from which Cusanus describes the relation between
layman and philosopher is somewhat different than that of Thomas. The layman
may be warning of the dangers of knowledge and erudition, but in all the three
books, he remains in dialogue with the philosopher. The conversation has even
a very friendly character. The layman takes the philosopher’s hand and shows him
the universe of his ideas. The philosopher attempts to translate these ideas into
the language of the philosophers. In addition, the layman asks the philosopher
what Aristotle has meant when he talked about mind. There is no disregard of
erudition and knowledge at all. It is the conversation taking place between the
two, which is essential and generates deep knowledge about the mysteries of the
mind. Already in the beginning of the Idiota de mente, the philosopher is fasci-
nated by the large number of faithful who are on pilgrimage in Rome – where
the dialogue is taking place – at that moment.57 Through their faith and devo-
55 ‘Nam video te deditum ad quaerendum sapientiam multo casso labore, a quo te revocare si pos-
sem, ita ut et tu errorem perpenderes, puto contrito laqueo te evasisse gauderes. Traxit te opinio
auctoritatis, ut sis quasi equus natura liber, sed arte capestro alligatus praesepi, ubi non aliud
comedit nisi quod sibi ministratur. Pascitur enim intellectus tuus auctoritati scribentium con-
strictus pabulo alieno et non naturali’ (Idiota de sapientia, I,2).
56 ‘Ego autem tibi dico, quod “sapientia foris” clamat “in plateis”, et est clamor eius, quoniam
ipsa habitat “in altissimis”. […] ORATOR: Ut audio, cum sis idiota, sapere te putas. IDIOTA:
Haec est fortassis inter te et me differentia: Tu te scientem putas, cum non sis, hinc superbis.
Ego vero idiotam me esse cognosco, hinc humilior. In hoc forte doctior exsisto. ORATOR:
Quomodo ductus esse potes ad scientiam ignorantiae tuae, cum sis idiota? IDIOTA: Non ex
tuis, sed ex dei libris. ORATOR: Qui sunt illi? IDIOTA: Quos suo digito scripsit. ORATOR:
Ubi reperiuntur? IDIOTA: Ubique. ORATOR: Igitur et in hoc foro? IDIOTA: Immo. Et iam
dixi, quod sapientia clamat “in plateis”. ORATOR: Optarem audire quomodo’ (Idiota de sapien-
tia I,3); ‘Putabam ego aliquando ipsam in obscuro melius reperiri. Magnae potentiae veritas
est, in qua posse ipsum valde lucet. Clamitat enim in plateis, sicut in libello De idiota legisti.
Valde certe se undique facilem repertu ostendit’ (De apice theoriae 5).
57 ‘Nam cum ex universis paene climatibus magna cum pressura innumerabiles populos transire
conspiciam, admiror omnium fidem unam in tanta corporum diversitate. Cum enim nullus
alteri similis esse possit, una tamen omnium fides est, quae eos tanta devotione de finibus orbis
advexit’ (Idiota de mente I,52).
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tion they know more about the human mind and its immortal character than
philosophers can reach through long and strenuous efforts. This fascination is
the reason why the philosopher wants to speak with the uneducated craftsman. 
Otherwise than Thomas, Cusanus intends to take the position of the learned
philosopher seriously. Theory has to take into account the perspective of the lay-
man and his experiences in a fundamental way. If we want to know truth, we
have to suppose that this is (also and perhaps primarily) lived and articulated in
the practice of human beings. Even the learned philosopher is not able to have
full understanding of truth as it is in itself. There are always other ways of see-
ing truth remaining, which we can not know. This is however no reason to
despair. In conversation and dialogue, the different positions can be confronted
with each other. In this conversation, a more fundamental measure can become
manifest. Cusanus presents the idiota as a kind of phenomenologist who is
observing his own occupations without being hindered by learned judgements
and reflects on what is going on while making a spoon.58 The spoon-maker
claims to possess a creative ability which does not need any real object which
his art imitates: ‘The spoon has no other exemplar except our mind’s idea of
the spoon. […] In my work, I do not imitate the visible form of any natural
object, for such forms of spoons, dishes and jars are perfected by human artistry
alone’.59
The layman describes the process of the production of the spoon, whose exem-
plar is invented by the mind and which is realized in wood. However, the spoon
is not realized in a perfect way. The spoon-maker describes his experience that
the idea of the spoon which he has in mind is never fully realized by the one he
makes. In fact it is the experience of every artist which is described here by the
layman: the real and concrete work of art is still not able to fully and exhaus-
tively express the artist’s idea. There can still be alternative expressions, and
although it is the artist’s own idea, he does not seem to understand it as the ulti-
mate idea. At the same time, the artist – in this case the spoon-maker – knows
very well that he can only understand his own idea by expressing it in material
and concrete objects. He has no choice. It is only by the actual making of spoons
that he knows that the idea is not yet fully realized.60 The spoon is an expression
58 This example has been made famous by Hans Blumenberg’s analysis of modernity in his Legiti-
mität der Neuzeit, Frankfurt a.M. 1966, 20.
59 ‘Coclear extra mentis nostrae ideam aliud non habet exemplar. Nam etsi statuarius aut pictor
trahat exemplaria a rebus, quas figurare satagit, non tamen ego, qui ex lignis cocleana et scutellas
et ollas ex luto educo. Non enim in hoc imitor figuram cuiuscumque rei naturalis’ (Idiota de
mente II, h2V, n 62).
60 ‘Esto igitur, quod artem explicare et formam coclearitatis, per quam coclear constituitur, sen-
sibilem facere velim; quae cum in sua natura nullo sensu sit attingibilis, quia nec alba, nec nigra
aut alterius coloris vel vocis vel odoris vel gustus vel tactus, conabor tamen eo modo, quo fieri
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of the idea, but it is not a precise one (in nullo praecise). Yet only at the moment
when the artist really makes a spoon, is he able to know that it is not a precise
expression. He will make more spoons, always knowing that the precise idea will
never be produced.
With this description, Cusanus intends to show the necessary ‘concrete’ char-
acter of thinking. In the making of the spoon, a reflective process is going on,
which turns around the ultimate measure of all things. The unreachable charac-
ter of this ultimate measure is not to be understood as a tragic condition, but is
the condition for further reflection. One does not need to have read books for
this reflection, but an attentive eye which notices how thoughts and ideas are
productive in concrete practice. The implication of this vision on the relation
between theory and practice is that learning and thinking too can be seen as prac-
tical occupations. The theoretician has to realise that his thoughts can only be
concretised in material reality. Through reflection on his own activities the lay-
man shows a mirror to the philosopher. 
Further on in the same book, the idiota describes metaphysical thinking – the
thinking in the perspective of the idea of truth – as the attempt of a painter who
tries to paint his own painting. It is the ultimate goal and task of every painter
to paint the art of painting itself. For Cusanus, the beauty of a painting consists
not in a successful production of the likeness of the image with the nature out-
side of the painting, but in the expression of the principles and limits of paint-
ing itself.61 For Cusanus, the task of the painter to paint the art of painting itself
potest, sensibilem facere. Unde materiam, puta lignum, per instrumentorum meorum, quae
applico, validum motum dolo et cavo, quousque in eo proportio debita oriatur, in qua forma
coclearitatis convenienter resplendeat; sic vides formam coclearitatis simplicem et insensibilem
in figurali proportione huius ligni quasi in imagine eius resplendere. Unde veritas et praecisio
coclearitatis, quae est immultiplicabilis et incommunicabilis, nequaquam potest per quaecum-
que etiam instrumenta et quemcumque hominem perfecte sensibilis fieri. Et in omnibus
coclearibus non nisi ipsa simplicissima forma varie relucet, magis in uno et minus in alio et in
nullo praecise’ (Idiota de mente II, ibid.).
61 ‘Ecce nosti mentem nostram vim quandam esse habens imaginem artis divinae iam dictae.
Unde omnia, quae absolutae arti verissime insunt, menti nostrae vere ut imagini insunt. Unde
mens est creata ab arte creatrice, quasi ars illa se ipsam creare vellet, et quia immultiplicabilis
est infinita ars, quod tunc eius surgat imago, sicut si pictor se ipsum depingere vellet et, quia
ipse non est multiplicabilis, tunc se depingendo oriretur eius imago. Et quia imago numquam
quantumcumque perfecta, si perfectior et conformior esse nequit exemplari, adeo perfecta est,
sicut quaecumque imperfecta imago, quae potentiam habet se semper plus et plus sine limita-
tione inaccessibili exemplari conformandi; in hoc enim infinitatem imaginis modo, quo potest,
imitatur, quasi si pictor duas imagines faceret, quarum una mortua videretur actu sibi similior, alia
autem minus similis viva, scilicet talis, quae se ipsam ex obiecto eius ad motum incitata con-
formiorem semper facere posset, nemo haesitat secundam perfectiorem quasi artem pictoris
magis imitantem’ (Idiota de mente XIII, h2V, n148-149).
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is not only necessary, but at the same time impossible. If the painter would suc-
ceed in painting such a portrait, he would have failed his goal. For he would have
painted all possible paintings, except one: namely the painting which expresses
all those possible paintings itself. One does not need too much speculative power
to understand that this process will never reach an end. Whatever the painter
will try, the painting of painting always will escape his perspective. The painter
is his own obstacle in reaching his goal: he will never be able to leave his point
of view and the more he tries to do this, the more he is involved in his own way
of looking.
But this is for Cusanus no argument at all to resign and not to undertake
attempts to paint the art of painting itself, for this attempt is the ‘essence’ of the
art of painting. The painter can discover the impossibility of his task only by his
attempts to fulfill it. The only way to fulfill his task is to give expression to its
impossibility. But how can he do this? Are there criteria for reaching this new
goal? Cusanus seems to be aware of the paradoxical fact that the painter is
confronted here with the same limits as before: it is as impossible to paint the
definite impossibility [of the painting of the painting] as it is to make the last
comprehensive painting. For Cusanus, there is only one way to escape from this
dilemma: by painting unexpected and subtle turns or perspectives – as e.g. in
Jan van Eyck’s Arnolfini-portrait in which the painter painted himself in a mir-
ror62 – the painter can break open the prison of his own perspective. The dis-
covery of being himself his own obstacle, results in a reversal of the perspective.
For, through the expression of this discovery, he shows that what has been
painted, could possibly be painted in infinite different manners. The reality
which is depicted is so rich that there could always be made more paintings of
it. 
Cusanus introduces here the distinction between a living image and a dead
one (imago viva and imago mortua). The painter of the dead image attempts to
depict objects outside the painting in a naturalistic – one almost could say: pho-
tographic – sense. A living image on the contrary shows the dynamics between
the painter and the measure with which he is wrestling. This dynamics is part
of an infinite process which turns into infinity and is in this sense a process of
identification with the divine measure. Layman and philosopher agree that it
is the final task of human beings to become the living image of God Himself.
We do not have to make works of art which remain outside the maker. Rather
we have to relate the elements and contradictions in our existence in such a way,
62 See Sylvie Tritz, ‘Ad imaginem et similitudinem: Bildtheologie, Malereitheorie und Kunstpraxis
zur Zeit des Nikolaus von Kues’, in: Inigo Bocken & Harald Schwaetzer (Eds.), Spiegel und Porträt:
Zur Bedeutung zweier zentraler Bilder im Denken des Nicolaus Cusanus, Aachen-Maastricht 2005,
197-230.
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that they express the divine measure. Then, we are not longer spectators of this
work of art, but we become the painting ourselves, with a divine spectator. 
The discovery that we are bound to our own perspective and that there
are always perspectives escaping our view, is already expressed in the first main
work of Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia (On learned ignorance, 1440) where
he speaks about infinity. In an infinite universe, the centre is everywhere and
necessarily identical with its periphery.63 In other words: every place in the uni-
verse is centre. The whole reality can be reflected from everywhere in the uni-
verse. We are able to know that the centre is everywhere. However it is not pos-
sible for human beings to understand all centres at the same time. This is only
reserved for God, who is the real Centre which can never be reached by rational
arguments. In this tension between the concrete and the divine centre, man can
be understood, in the view of Cusanus, as a microcosm in which the whole of
reality is present, though in the way of this concrete being. 
There is only a small distance between the concept of the microcosm
and the figure of the layman. Theory, the vision of the divine centre, can never
be reserved for only some. Every individual human being has to discover his
own centre, in a search for the divine centre in his own (microcosmic) existence.
This search never can be realised in a syllogistic-theoretical way. Therefore, the
philosopher needs the dialogue with the layman who is able to show him that
there are still perspectives which he does not know. 
In short: there are a number of similarities both in the logic we have discovered
in the Imitatio Christi and the philosophy of the layman as can be found in the
work of Cusanus. In both models, it is the search for the inner measure of all
things, which is central. Both in Thomas of Kempen and Cusanus, this meas-
ure can not be articulated by rational theories – not because of its irrational
character, but because it is a living measure. For both thinkers, Christological
aspects play a crucial role even if these are not elaborated in an objective theo-
logical way. The precise imitation of the living measure is in fact the only pos-
sible guarantee that reality is no subject to the narrowing measure of the ratio.
(Christology breaks open rational thinking, not because there is something which
can be believed for not-rational reasons, but because this living measure itself
originates a more fundamental form of rationality with which human being can
handle with reality.) Again, we find an important similarity between Cusanus and
63 ‘Propter quod machinam mundanam habere aut istam terram sensibilem aut aerem vel ignem
vel aliud quodcumque pro centro fixo et immobili variis motibus orbium consideratis est
impossibile. Non devenitur enim in motu ad minimum simpliciter, puta fixum centrum, quia
minimum cum maximo coincidere necesse est. Centrum igitur mundi coincidit cum circum-
ferentia. Non habet igitur mundus circumferentiam’ (De docta ignorantia II,11, h I, p. 99/100,
nr. 156).
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Thomas: the stress on the concrete character of the way to be followed. One can
not avoid this way by referring to a fixed theoretical opinion. For both thinkers
it is a way of internalisation: it is ultimately the measure in ourselves that we have
to search for. For both thinkers, this search is a very concrete matter, and its medium
is the practical life. ‘Thinking’ is not reserved anymore for highly abstract and
sophisticated scholastic treatises.
The experience of opposition and conflict has a central meaning in both models.
Both thinkers are searching for a ‘coincidence of opposites’ (coincidentia opposi-
torum). Oppositions do not have to be resolved ‘from the outside’, but have to
experienced and internalised. This is not only (and even not primarily) expressed
by the ‘inner fight’ of devotional life, but also in the friendly conversation
between philosopher and layman, who discover in their opposite positions a
more fundamental and fruitful unity. We have to be penetrated by the opposite
(the ‘other’) of our own intimate judgements and are asked for answers to the
questions we are confronted with. Finally there is the logic of conversation which
is common to both authors. Only in conversations, the relative meaning of words
and judgements can become manifest. This relativity – contrary to the logic of
modernity – creates a dynamic space between words and the reality which is
expressed in these words; and thus, the living, ‘silent’ measure of the divine
becomes audible in human speaking. This idea of a converting conversation can
be found both in Cusanus and Thomas of Kempen. 
However, there is also a difference which is important for our investigation.
Cusanus intends primarily to redefine the position of classical theory in the light
of the dialogue with the layman. The Imitatio Christi on the other hand focuses
on the layman and the way in which he is able to bring his existence into light.
The polemical attitude towards learned theoreticians is almost totally absent in
the work of Cusanus. The disregard of learned knowledge is only expressed in a
ironic way by a friendly warning. One could read this change of accent as a careful
implicit criticism of the radical disregard of learned knowledge by the devotio
moderna. However, it seems that Cusanus has seen the explosive theoretical
potential which is silently present in the pious way of the devotio moderna and
has taken it a step further. In this sense the philosophy of the layman can be
understood as an attempt to lead the implicit theoretical ideas of the devotio
moderna into the realm of scientific knowledge.
4. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS – THE ENLIGHTENMENT OF THE LAYMAN
If it is true that the religious movement of the devotio moderna presupposed its
own paradigm of rationality, which has been forgotten or even denied in ‘moder-
nity’, what is the meaning of this model for a theory of spirituality today? 
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Primarily, it can deliver a contribution to the historical self-reflection of spir-
ituality, in which the lived experience of faith is central instead of the abstract
validity of arguments. But we hope to have proven however, that the opposition
between rational argumentation and inner concrete experience is not a valid
opposition in the perspective of the devotio moderna. Thomas shows that the
concrete practice of faith bears measures in itself which are certainly rational.
Beyond the liberation from prejudices is the word which shines through the dark
chaos of opposites and dependencies and which offers clarification. The Modern
Devotion did not only claim social or ecclesiastic right of existence for simple
laymen, but this movement showed that the rationality of classical (theological
and philosophical) theory was too narrow to reach its own intrinsic goal, namely
the comprehension of the inner life and the vision of God. The logic of the
devotio moderna offers therefore a reinterpretation of classical theory. The theo-
retical model of the devotio moderna demonstrates that the lived experience of
God (spirituality) is always a rational process even if this rationality also exists
in the awareness of the limits of rationality. The awareness of these limits can
however only be productive inasmuch as these are understood in contrast with
divine rationality. The space which is originated by this contrast is spirituality.64
The tension between emancipative (‘liberating’) and ‘specialist’ aspects of the mod-
ern layman, which we discussed in the introduction, can also be found in the
Imitatio Christi. The claim for spiritual specialisation is clearly rejected by
Thomas. The way of the imitation of Christ has to be followed by every indi-
vidual, again and again. This however does not mean that there are no criteria
with which the faithful can answer the question whether he is on the right way
or into which directions he should go. Paradoxically all these criteria are deduced
from the awareness that the real measure for progression and specialisation lies
only in God’s hand.
The theme of ‘grace’ plays an important role in the Imitatio Christi. This grace
however, does not mean that we do not have any comprehension of the way we
have to follow. Interiority, humility, inner detachment: these are only some of
the criteria which are products of the attempts to deal with grace. These are so
to say ‘virtues’65 which are given by Thomas as food on the way of the faithful.
Although grace – the divine measure – as such escapes all forms of calculation,
we are able to think about the ways with which we are capable to deal with this
64 This interpretation of a theory of spirituality is in strong opposition with theories like that of
Peter Widmer, whose concept of a ‘materialistic’ theory understands mysticism as the ‘otherness’
of reason. See: Peter Widmer, Mystikforschung zwischen Materialismus und Metaphysik, Freiburg
2004. 
65 Paul van Tongeren, Deugdelijk leven: Een inleiding in de deugdethiek, Budel 2003.
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unpredictability. This unpredictability of God is not an absolute, isolated
moment. Grace is rather the expression of the difference between human and
divine measure which are related by the concrete imitatio. In this process, no one
can be a specialist, for it comprises the whole life. However learned a human
being may be, he remains a layman if he starts the imitatio. The real specialist
in this field is God himself. This is the critical moment of the imitatio Christi
which we have to internalise again and again. With every progressing step, even
in humility and inner awareness, it is only the divine light which we make more
visible. Only he, who knows that he does not know, can make progress, as
Cusanus would say in his On Learned Ignorance. And it is exactly this knowledge
which is a liberating, emancipating knowledge. 
But what kind of knowledge is it which is mediated by spirituality? In a func-
tionalistic society, characterised by specialisation, there seems to be no place
for comprehensive claims. Because of the universalising of trade mechanisms, the
need to show clear and sharp profiles is increased in a disproportional way, as
diagnosed by the German philosopher of culture, Hermann Lübbe.66 In this
sense, the much discussed religious fundamentalism is only one among possible
variations of the modern commandment to live in an uncommitted way. In an
universe in which everything is uncommitted, there is no limit which keeps us
from taking one hypothesis for absolute. Perhaps the need of taking ideas and
new authority for absolute is even greater than ever before. For there is nothing
which can not be questioned, except perhaps the virtue of tolerance which should
protect us from absolute claims, and even this virtue is nowadays subject of dis-
cussion and critics. ‘Flexibility’ is one of the principal words and values with
which the hidden ideology of our society manifests itself. Nothing which is valu-
able can not be transformed or improved, there is no boundary which can not
be crossed. ‘Changing’ is no accidental reality anymore which we can not escape
and which we have to deal with, but seems to have become ultimate value, for
which we have to strive. Lacking any other measure, modernity had to proclaim
change as the ultimate meaning of our acting, thinking and living.
The domination of economic rationality is the consequence of this absolute
flexibility. Those who were in a leading position yesterday can have lost every-
thing today. Even firm and traditional institutes as the university, which were
responsible for the unique flourishing of European culture, have to bow before
the changing measures of market. All interiority – that is: the intrinsic value of
ideas – seems to dissolve in this flood of functionality, which is in it self subject
of changing. There is no foundation which is able to escape this flood and which
does not become ‘measured’.
66 Hermann Lübbe, Politik nach der Aufklärung, München 2001, 32.
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The emancipation from the hierarchical order, which has been characteristic
for the ‘old European’ culture (Luhmann), seems to suppose that everyone is a
specialist, that everyone is able to manipulate reality for his own interests. This
model has, however, more in common with the scholastic theoretical paradigm
than its modern representatives are aware of. For this model supposes that human
beings are acting and thinking outside of reality. The model of the devotio moderna
is deeply suffused with the awareness that we are always involved in the process
of reality and that the rupture between man and reality can ultimately be seen
as the unbridgeable tension between human and divine perspective. 
With these considerations lies the answer which criteria in the tradition of the
devotio moderna can make a contribution to an actual theory of spirituality. Such
a theory is able to trace this tension between divine and human judgement in
different social and cultural systems and elaborate it. This is only possible inas-
much as the ‘theory’ of the devotio moderna can be seen as an attempt to answer
the same question as the one who challenged the leading modern thinkers of sub-
jectivity: how to deal with our inability to articulate the real measure of all things
and all our judgements? A theory of spirituality from the perspective of the
layman is able to show in every form of social action and thinking that every
specialist is in fact a layman. This requires a long and differentiated hermeneu-
tical process. However, the same was true for the imitation of Christ itself. This
spiritual hermeneutics of social systems and fields of experience, has as its goal
to search again and again for the connection between darkness and light, between
the exterior and the interior life. This spirituality shows, through the realising
of its knowledge in concrete forms of life and action, the necessity to make a step
backwards and to understand all absolute claims in the light of the path which,
as Thomas of Kempen formulates according to the Gospel, leads from darkness
into light. Spiritual hermeneutics can therefore be understood as the enlightenment
of the Enlightenment.
SUMMARY
Both as metaphor and as social reality, the figure of the ‘layman’ belongs to the most
fundamental paradigms of modern culture. The paradigm is characterised by a paradox,
with which every actual theory of spirituality is confronted. On the one hand, there is
the emancipative meaning of ‘layman’ which rejects every kind of authority. On the
other hand, one can observe the increasing meaning of ‘specialists’ in our societies. Posing
the question what ‘spirituality’ exactly means, one cannot avoid giving a model in which
this tension is taken into account.
In this article we refer to an important text of the spiritual tradition of the devotio
moderna, the Dutch religious reform movement in 15th century: the Imitatio Christi by
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Thomas of Kempen. Not only can this work be seen as an attempt to develop a spiri-
tuality for laymen, but it seems also to offer a new theoretical paradigm for the expression
of the concrete encounter with God, different from the abstract scholastic theological
and philosophical models. A comparison between the paradigm of the Imitatio Christi and
the ‘lay-philosophy’ of Nicholas of Cusa, who was narrowly connected with the devotio
moderna, shows the theoretical meaning of this ‘spiritual’ work.
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